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Abstract The development of social cognition is defined
as the behavioral patterns, feelings, attitudes, and concepts
that children manifest in relation to other people, and the
way in which these different functions change with age. To
understand the development of social cognition, modelling
based on longitudinal behavioral observation is essential.
Neuroimaging techniques will aid in this process by
providing the neural basis of the psychological constructs,
and the constraints for the model. Here, the issue of self-
recognition and self-evaluation is presented as an example.
Technical advances will allow the application of functional
neuroimaging techniques directly to babies and/or children,
particularly under the age of 6 years old, in the near future.
Keywords Developmental psychology . Functional MRI .
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Developmental social psychology and neuroimaging
techniques
How do we become social beings? This developmental
social psychology question is attracting growing interest in
Japan in the face of recent reports on the declining birthrate,
the breakdown in classroom discipline, and social with-
drawal. Social cognition is defined as the processing of
information that culminates in the accurate perception of
the dispositions and intentions of other individuals
(Brothers 1990). The development of social cognition is
defined as the behavioral patterns, feelings, attitudes, and
concepts that children manifest in relation to other people,
and the way in which these different functions change with
age (Schaffer 1996).
To understand the development of social cognition,
initially we have to identify the elementary constructs of
social cognition that can be measured and quantified. As
with other psychological models, the models of develop-
mental social cognition use hypothetical representations
and the processes on them. There is no direct evidence
supporting the existence of processes and representation:
their existence must be inferred on the basis of the success
of the model. However, hypothetical representation is
sufficiently powerful to produce a limitless number of
models to account for the data. Thus, some constraints are
necessary (Willingham and Dunn 2003). Classically, reac-
tion time or error/success rate in developmental psychology
was the method used to provide such constraints. However,
recent advances in neuroimaging techniques have provided
another approach. Neuroimaging techniques such as func-
tional MRI (fMRI) allow associations between the psycho-
logical constructs and specific human brain areas to be made
non-invasively. The essence of this method is brain
localization. Thus neuroimaging techniques are an additional
way of differentiating between the models by their specific
predictions for how fMRI response to the task would be
affected by task parameters (Willingham and Dunn 2003).
Longitudinal behavioral data allow us to describe
changes in behavior across age, that is, the chronological
order of the emergence of functions X and Y (behavioral
milestones). As the behavior should be tightly linked to the
brain function, changes in behavior across age are conceiv-
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ably accompanied by the changes in the brain development
which is reflected in the task-related activation pattern to
the particular behavioral tasks. As the adult brain is the result
of the development through the past, it is conceivable that
adult fMRI can pinpoint the neural substrates of functions X
and Y. Then their functional relationship could be further
tested by other interventional techniques such as TMS
(transcranial magnetic stimulation), or lesion studies in adults.
Identification of the neural correlates of behavioral mile-
stones in adults is essential to collecting/analyzing child
fMRI data when available. Furthermore, anatomical infor-
mation provides important implications for the construction
of the developmental model, because the information of the
location-specific function is accumulated in the neuroscience
field. Finally, neuroimaging studies could provide the way to
test the hypothesis derived from the models.
An example is the mirror neuron system (MNS). MNS is
first described by non-human primate experiments, followed
by numerous functional neuroimaging studies (Iacoboni and
Dapretto 2006, for review). The MNS is composed of
inferior frontal gyrus, parietal lobe, and superior temporal
sulcus. MNS is supposed to encode both goal-directed action
and observation, and thus is closely related to imitation
(Iacoboni and Dapretto 2006). Imitation is closely linked to
the development of the theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al.
1993). With the hypothesis that the core deficit of autism is
the reduced ability of imitation that is mediated by MNS, an
fMRI was conducted on children (around 12 years old) with
autism spectrum disorder during an imitation of emotional
facial expression (Dapretto et al. 2006). They found reduced
task related activity in MNS of the autism group compared
with control group, suggesting that a dysfunction of MNS
underlies the social deficits of autism (Dapretto et al. 2006).
At present, applying the neuroimaging approach to
pediatric populations is difficult due to technical limitations
(Aslin and Mehler 2005), particularly under 6 years old.
We therefore propose the following strategy for develop-
mental social psychology. The elementary constructs of
social cognition detected by behavioral analysis along the
developmental time axis are localized in the adult brain.
This information is used to provide constraints for the
developmental model, which in turn is tested by longitudi-
nal observation (Fig. 1). Here we present an example of this
approach for studying the development of self-recognition
and self-awareness (Morita et al. 2008) that occur in the
ages of 1.5 to 3 year old.
Self-awareness and self-recognition in adults
As adults, we can experience extreme distaste and even
aversion when we are shown our own images as recorded
in a photograph or video. We can also become highly self-
conscious when we unexpectedly see our own reflected
image as we walk through the streets of a city. This reaction
is caused by the self-awareness provoked by the feedback
of our own image. There are two types of self-awareness:
“public self-awareness” that is provoked when one accesses
recognizable external information on the self such as one’s
face or body, and “private self-awareness” that is provoked
when one accesses internal personal information that cannot
be directly observed such as one’s beliefs and thoughts. As
Behavioral analysis










Fig. 1 An approach to social cognitive development with neuro-
imaging techniques. Horizontal black lines indicate the age of
observation by means of neuroimaging (upper horizontal line) and
behavioral analysis (lower horizontal line). Vertical arrows indicate
the timing of the observation. Using adult fMRI, the neural substrates
of the elementary constructs of social cognition detected by behavioral
analysis are depicted. This information is used to provide constraints
for the developmental model construction, which in turn is tested by
longitudinal quantitative behavioral observation. Furthermore, identi-
fication of the neural correlates of the behavioral milestones in adults
is essential to conduct/ analyze child neuroimaging data (red vertical
arrows) when available
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private self-awareness is accompanied by a conceptual or
abstract sense of self-awareness, it is considered to be a
form of self-awareness at a higher level than that of public
self-awareness (Morin 2006).
By directing attention towards the self, the perceptual
feedback of self images initiates an automatic comparison
against standards, which comprise mental representations of
ideal behaviors or attitudes (Duval and Wicklund 1972).
This mental process is defined as self-evaluation. If the
actual self does not reach the standards that are set by the
subject, he or she experiences negative feelings such as
embarrassment and guilt. By contrast, if these standards are
met, the subject experiences positive feelings such as pride.
These feelings are classified as self-conscious emotions.
Development of self-recognition and self-awareness
When do children start recognizing themselves? The mark test
devised by Gallup (1970) is widely used in the measurement
of self-recognition in human infants and primates (Gallup
1970). In this method, subjects view themselves in a mirror
after rouge has been secretly applied to their face. Rouge-
directed responses are used to infer self-recognition. Human
infants aged between 6 and 11 months are frequently observed
to react by laughing or touching the mirror, but they almost
never touch their own bodies. This indicates that infants
regard their own image in the mirror as that of a different
person. However, once a child reaches the age of between
18 months and 2 years, he or she will touch and attempt to
remove the lipstick or mark on the basis of the image reflected
in the mirror (Amsterdam 1972). It is because these children
realize that the reflected image is their own that they are able
to touch their body and not the mirror. Such a child is thus
thought to have acquired the ability of self-recognition. This
test is used as an indicator of the emergence of the concept of
self in the field of developmental psychology, and is also
regarded as an important indicator of cognitive ability in the
field of evolutionary psychology.
Soon after children are capable of recognizing their own
image in a mirror, they demonstrate self-conscious or coy
reactions upon seeing their own reflection in this way
(Lewis et al. 1989). This is called exposure embarrassment,
which is a feeling that accompanies an awareness of self,
and is referred to as a “self-conscious emotion” in order to
distinguish it from innate emotions such as joy and anger
(Sullivan et al. 2003) (Fig. 2). At this developmental stage,
the exposure embarrassment and other self-conscious
emotions, such as empathy and jealousy, occasionally arise
when a child becomes the center of attention or is the
subject of praise (Lewis et al. 1989). Lewis and colleagues
(Lewis 1997) conducted mark tests on infants aged
18 months during an experiment in which they were
praised. They found that the emergence of self-recognition
was linked to the exposure embarrassment produced by
praise from other people. Bischof-Köhler (1991) indicates
that self-recognition is linked to the sense of empathy
(Bischof-Köhler 1991). This reaction is regarded as the
manifestation of lower-level public self-awareness.
Development of self-evaluation and high-level
self-evaluation
Whereas exposure embarrassment is evident in children at
around 2 years of age, the sense of shame, evaluative
embarrassment, guilt, and pride that emerge as a conse-
quence of self-evaluation begin to appear when a child is
around the age of 3 years. This corresponds precisely to the
age when the process of self-evaluation emerges (Alessandri
and Lewis 1993). The self-conscious emotion caused by self-
evaluation is closely related to the acquisition of norms and
rules with which one’s behavior is compared (Lewis 1997).
If inappropriate behavior that departs from the established
criteria is discovered, this will be fed back in the form of
negative feelings such as shame and embarrassment, and
future actions will be revised accordingly. In other words, the
self-conscious emotion evoked by self-evaluation might act
as a modifier of one’s own behavior and attitudes.
In summary, these developmental psychological findings
imply that the neural representations of self-recognition and
self-awareness might be distinct, and that different levels of
self-awareness exist.
Adult fMRI study of self-face recognition
and self-evaluation
To dissect the neural substrates of self-awareness at high and
low levels, and those of self-face recognition (Platek et al.
Age (Mo) Construct Related construct Related self-conscious emotion
18 Self recognition
24 Self awareness low level Exposure-embarrassment
empathy jealousy
30-36 Self awareness high level Self evaluation Evaluative-embarrassment
guilty pride
Development of Self
Fig. 2 Development of self and
self-conscious emotion (modi-
fied from Sullivan et al 2003)
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2004; Sugiura et al. 2005, 2006; Uddin et al. 2005), we
conducted an fMRI study with 19 adult normal volunteers
(Morita et al. 2008). The first experimental hypothesis was
that the brain regions that responded to evaluative embarrass-
ment would reflect the process itself or the self-evaluation
process that characterizes higher level self-awareness. This is
because the feeling of evaluative embarrassment is caused by
differences between immediate perceptions and standards.
The second hypothesis was that the neural substrates of lower-
level self-awareness (that is, public self-awareness) would be
strongly recruited when participants who had a strong
disposition to attend to the observable aspects of the self were
exposed to feedback face images (public self-consciousness).
This disposition can be measured by a questionnaire using
the “self-consciousness scale”, which assesses the personal
trait of self-consciousness. This scale includes two sub-
scales: a public self-consciousness subscale and a private
self-consciousness subscale. The public self-consciousness
subscale assesses the tendency to care about visible aspects
of the self. The private self-consciousness subscale assesses
the tendency to think about inner or abstract aspects of the
self. Using these scores, we investigated the relationship
between the personal trait of self-consciousness and the
brain regions that are related to the evaluation of one’s own
facial appearance.
In order to induce embarrassment in the participants
during the experiment, we prepared facial images selected
from video-recordings. When the video-recordings were
paused, it was possible to isolate unnatural or strange faces
that deviated from the participants’ normal photographic
images, for example due to a widely open mouth or partly
closed eyes (Fig. 3). Showing the participants unusual facial
images of themselves was intended to cause them embar-
rassment. We prepared 21 images of each participant’s own
face and those of others. The participant’s own facial images
and those of others appeared in the center of a screen for 3 s
in random order. During the session, the participants were
required to rate how photogenic each face was by giving a
score ranging from 1=“very bad” to 7=“very good”. They
were also required to press the button assigned to each score
when a fixation cross appeared. Each session included 21
trials for the SELF condition, 21 trials for the OTHERS
condition, and seven “null events” in which no stimulus was
shown. We repeated each session four times.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the photogenic
score measured inside the scanner and the embarrassment
score measured outside the scanner. Participants experi-
enced strong embarrassment when they viewed their own
face images evaluated as very bad. Thus, it was probable
that the participants experienced embarrassment when they
viewed their own faces during the fMRI experiment.
The embarrassment scores measured outside the scanner
were used as parametric covariates in the analysis. This
allowed the evaluation of modulation of the neuronal
activities that co-varied with embarrassment. First, we
specified the brain regions that were more strongly
activated during self-evaluation than during the evaluation
of others. We found significant activations in the right
prefrontal cortex (PFC), bilateral insular cortex, bilateral
occipital cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. The signif-
icant activations in the PFC were found only in the right
hemisphere. The posterior cluster was located in the inferior
part of the precentral gyrus, which corresponded to
Brodmann’s area (BA) 6 or 44. By contrast, the anterior
cluster was located in the middle inferior frontal gyrus
(mIFG), corresponding to BA 45 or 46 (Fig. 4).
Right mIFG for self-evaluation
Within the areas activated by the contrast of SELF versus
OTHERS, we identified those where the activity in the
SELF condition co-varied with the embarrassment scores
(Fig. 4). We did not identify any regions that showed a
positive correlation with the scores. However, we found a
region that showed a negative correlation with the scores in
the right PFC. This area was included in the anterior cluster,
and so was located in the mIFG. It was selectively activated
during the evaluation of self face images, but not during the
evaluation of others. The activation in this area was not
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Fig. 3 (Top) Embarrassment scores. After MRI scanning, the
participants rated how embarrassed they felt when they viewed their
own or others’ images by giving a score ranging from 1 to 9. The
larger the score, the greater the embarrassment. (Bottom) Relationship
between photogenic score and embarrassment score for each face. The
photogenic score was measured inside the scanner, and the embar-
rassment score was measured outside the scanner. Participants
experienced strong embarrassment when they viewed their own face
images that were evaluated as very bad
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negative correlation made it unlikely that the right mIFG
represented the induced embarrassment itself. As the right
mIFG was selectively activated during the evaluation of
one’s own face, but not the faces of others, it might be
related to the self-evaluation that induces embarrassment.
The right lateral PFC is involved in self-referential
processing, including autobiographical memory retrieval
(Fink et al. 1996; Vogeley et al. 1999), or the evaluation of
traits concerning the self (Ochsner et al. 2005; Schmitz et
al. 2004). Schmitz and colleagues suggested that the
increased activity in the right PFC during self-evaluation
is associated with increased self-relevance. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the right mIFG is selectively
engaged in self-evaluation, reflecting self-relevance
(Schmitz et al. 2004).
Right ventral precentral gyrus
The right ventral precentral gyrus, which is part of the
ventral premotor area, showed activation during face
recognition, and was more strongly activated when viewing
one’s own face, although it was still responsive to others’
faces. The “mirror neuron” network including the ventral
premotor area has been suggested to be important for
imitation (Iacoboni and Mazziotta 2007) in order to
establish communication between individuals via a simula-
tion mechanism that maps the actions of others onto one’s
own motor repertoire (Uddin et al. 2005). Uddin and
colleagues postulated the “mirror neuron” systems are
activated by self-face recognition because of the ease with
which one can map oneself onto one’s own motor system
(Uddin et al. 2005).
Furthermore, activation of the right ventral precentral
gyrus is reportedly modulated by the extent of public self-
consciousness. People with high public self-consciousness
tend to react strongly and become publicly self-aware when
they are exposed to inducers of public self-awareness, such
as perceptual feedback (Buss 1980). As mentioned previ-
ously, self images in a mirror can induce a coy reaction or
exposure embarrassment that reflects lower-level self-
awareness at the age of 24 months. An autism study by
Dawson and McKissick showed that self-recognition
measured by the mark test and imitation were not directly
related, but rather imitation was related to public self-
awareness (Dawson and McKissick 1984). These findings
suggest the existence of a psychological construct such as
“interest in self” (Fig. 5) (Akagi 2003) that is represented in
the right ventral precentral gyrus. Interest in self is related
to low-level self-awareness that cannot be measured by the
mark test, but is manifested by exposure embarrassment
(Akagi 2003).
In several pathological conditions, interest in self might
be lacking. For instance, autistic children are able to recognize
their own image in a mirror, but they display a neutral reaction


























































Fig. 4 Activation pattern of the
right mIFG (light blue). From
within the areas identified as
active by the contrast of SELF
versus OTHERS (a), we identi-
fied the brain regions where the
activity in the SELF condition
co-varied with the embarrass-
ment scores. The right mIFG
showed a negative correlation
with the scores (b). The right
mIFG was selectively activated
during the evaluation of own
face images, but not during the
evaluation of others (c). The
right ventral precentral gyrus
(dark blue, d) responded to both
self and other faces. The activa-
tion showed a significant posi-
tive correlation with the public
self-consciousness score (blue
closed circle, e) of the self-
consciousness scale. There was
no significant correlation with
the private self-consciousness
score (magenta closed triangle)
Brain Imaging and Behavior (2008) 2:335–342 339
embarrassment (Dawson and McKissick 1984; Spiker and
Ricks 1984). Abused children also display a neutral or
negative reaction to their image as reflected in a mirror, with
little evidence of self-conscious emotion (Schneider-Rosen
and Cicchetti 1991). Thus, interest in self might be an
important element that creates links across imitation, self-
awareness, and autism. Future studies are needed to clarify
the detailed relationships among these functions.
Implication of fMRI results for the model
of development of self
As self-recognition and self-evaluation functions emerge at
different stages of development (Fig. 5), the period of
maturation of the two prefrontal regions might differ
correspondingly. During the period between 18 months
and 2 years when self-recognition is acquired, infants also
begin to imitate the intentional actions of other people. The
interest in self and the associated exposure embarrassment,
and the imitation of the intentional actions of other people,
are both accompanied by activation of the ventral premotor
region. Thus, the ventral premotor region might well begin
to develop and to function at this time. The self-evaluation
and recall of autobiographical memories emerge at the same
time (around the age of 3 years). Thus, the mIFG, which is
related to the processing of higher-level self-related
information, matures later than the ventral premotor region.
These results present new possibilities for identifying
the order of maturation of the neural representation of
specific functions through the timing of their emergence
(Fig. 5). The functional neuroimaging of infants is still
limited in terms of the measurements and tasks that can be
applied (but, see below); however, direct investigation of
the brain functions of children is not necessarily the only
effective way of studying brain development. As was
proposed earlier, combining the past knowledge accumu-
lated in the field of cognitive neuroscience with that from
the field of developmental psychology could shed new
light on the development of the brain. This type of
approach, combining the extraction of landmark behavior,
brain localization, and model formation, can be applied to
all stages of social cognitive development, and necessi-
tates close collaborations between neuroimagers and
developmental psychologists.
Direct measures of the infant brain: future perspectives
In the school age group (>6 years old), it is possible to
conduct structural MRI or even functional MRI in awake
condition. This is because at this age, the majority of
children can follow the instructions to stay still in the
closed space in the magnet for about half an hour, and to
conduct specific tasks. However, in younger age group
(<6 years old), it is almost impossible.
The development of the technology needed to apply
neuroimaging techniques to pediatric groups is ongoing.
Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) is one of the most
promising approaches for use in infants (Aslin and Mehler
2005). NIRS is a non-invasive neuroimaging technique that
measures the change in oxy-/deoxy- hemoglobin concen-
tration in the cerebral blood vessels that reflects neuronal
activity. As NIRS utilizes near-infrared light, it is highly
applicable to infants in naturalistic conditions. Recent
advances in NIRS have facilitated the accurate and non-
invasive measurement of time-course changes of the
oxyhemoglobin concentration ([HbO]) and deoxyhemoglo-
bin concentration ([HbR]) during neural activation in
humans (for a review, see Gibson et al. 2005; Villringer et
al. 1993, 1994). Simultaneous measurements of NIRS and
fMRI data have indicated that these two methodologies are
well correlated (Kleinschmidt et al. 1996; Punwani et al.
1998; Toyoda et al. 2008). Since the mid-1990s, NIRS has
been used in awake human infants in conjunction with tasks
that assess visual (Taga et al. 2003), memory, and language
functions. Recently, NIRS has been applied to infants in
conjunction with sophisticated tasks that are relevant to
aspects of developmental social psychology, such as face
preferences (Nakato et al. 2007; Otsuka et al. 2007), and
language-specific phonemic discrimination (Minagawa-
Kawai et al. 2007). Thus, despite some technical challenges
(such as those related to the attachment of probes,
limitations of the spatial resolution and coverage field,
and co-registration with anatomical data), in concert with
electrophysiological techniques (such as electroencephalog-
Age (Mo) Construct Related construct Related self-conscious
emotion
Corresponding neural
substrates (by adults fMRI)
Self-related activity
(by adults fMRI)
18 Self recognition Right parieto-premotor
24 Self awareness
low level
Interest in self Exposure-embarrassment
empathy jealousy
Right PMv Positive correlation with





Right middle IFG Negative correlation with
embarrassment
Development of Self and related neural representation
Fig. 5 Revised model of development of self and self-conscious emotion. PMv, ventral premotor cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus
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raphy and event-related potential), NIRS is “emerging as a
third noninvasive window into the infant brain” (Aslin and
Mehler 2005) (Fig. 1).
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